Kentucky Law Journal
Volume 58

Issue 1

Article 9

1969

Workmen's Compensation--"Exclusive Remedy" Clause--Third Part
Indemnity Suit
Donald K. James
University of Kentucky

Follow this and additional works at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj
Part of the Workers' Compensation Law Commons

Right click to open a feedback form in a new tab to let us know how this document benefits you.
Recommended Citation
James, Donald K. (1969) "Workmen's Compensation--"Exclusive Remedy" Clause--Third Part Indemnity
Suit," Kentucky Law Journal: Vol. 58: Iss. 1, Article 9.
Available at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj/vol58/iss1/9

This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UKnowledge. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Kentucky Law Journal by an authorized editor of UKnowledge. For more information,
please contact UKnowledge@lsv.uky.edu.

KmNTuC

LAw Joum-TAL

[VOL 58

for it is this very act which is nullified by the grant of a new trial
on the issue of damages alone.
The Court included what may become a very important caveat
to its rule on partial retrials by stating that, "We conclude that the
cases involving inadequacy of damages should be governed by the
general rule which favors the directing of limited or partial retrials
except where such would result in injustice... f1 (Emphasis added.)
What situations fall into this category? We can readily eliminate
all irregularities in proof of damages, for these are to be retried in
even the limited new trial. But if we adhere to the theory that an
award of damages, no matter how inadequate, necessarily means
that the jury found the defendant negligent and plaintiff not guilty
of contributory negligence, 48 what remains? The answers to these
questions will, no doubt, be resolved as particular cases arise in
which an exception is obviously necessary. Perhaps the Court will
recognize that "passion and prejudice" are not necessarily factors of
degree, but may also be factors of decision, and re-evaluate the
"resolution of liability" theory at least as to awards of nominal and
"less than substantial and inadequate" damages. 49 Perhaps the scales
will be balanced through a closer scrutiny of errors alleged by the
defendant in his cross-appeal in those cases where liability is unclear. 50
In any event, it cannot be believed that the Kentucky Court of Appeals
will allow a plaintiff to use this case to parlay a sympathy verdict, or
any other undeserved verdict, into a windfall.
Jerry Lee Foster

RwnY" CLAusE-TnmD
Srr.-In 1948, the Jackson County Rural Electric
Cooperative Corporation [hereinafter Jackson] constructed a distribution line running from its electric transmission line in Clay County.
In 1950, the Kentucky Utilities Company [hereinafter KU] constructed
an electric transmission line which crossed Jackson's line and was
erected at a height of six feet or more above the highest point on
WouaN's
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47 432 S.W.2d at 428.

See note 45, supra.
Ashland Coca Cola Bottling Co. v. Brady, 252 Ky. 183, 188, 66 S.W.2d
57, 58-59 (1933), suggests that verdicts which are inadequate are peversely
stated verdicts for defendant. Cf., Baries v. Louisville Elec. Light Co., 118 Ky.
830, 80 S.W. 814 (1904).
50 Ashland Coca Cola Bottling Co. v. Brady, 252 Ky. 183, 186, 66 S.W.2d
57, 58 (1933), suggests that this was the practice as to inadequate awards of
general damages prior to amendment of Code of Civil Practice § 340.
48
49
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that line. This was in accordance with the margin-of-safety standards
of the National Electric Safety Code adopted and approved by the
Public Service Commission of Kentucky. In 1957, without notice to
KU, Jackson elevated its line within three feet of KU's line in violation
of the aforementioned safety standards. That hazardous condition
remained unchanged until May 20, 1964, when Jackson sent a crew
of its employees, including one Kenneth L. Norris, to replace a pole
near the intersection of the lines. Norris was electrocuted in the
course of his duties when contact was made between the two lines.
Both Norris and Jackson had accepted and were working under the
provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act at the time of the
accident.
Norris' personal representative filed a common law wrongful death
action seeking recovery from KU. KU, along with its co-appellant
liability carrier, settled that suit by payment of $50,000 to Norris'
personal representative. The further sum of $8,324.26 was expended
for attorneys' fees, court costs and investigation expenses.
KU (and its insurance carrier) then brought an action seeking
indemnity against Jackson to recoup its outlay of $58,324.26. The
entire theory of recovery in that action was that the negligence of
KU in failing to inspect, discover, and remedy the hazardous condition created by Jackson was secondary negligence, whereas the
negligence of Jackson in creating the hazardous condition was primary
negligence. It was alleged that the primary negligence of Jackson
exposed KU to civil liability to the estate of Norris, and that KU
and its insurance carrier were therefore entitled to indemnity.
Jackson sought to defeat KU'S claim by reason of the language of
Kentucky's Workmen's Compensation Act which stated, in pertinent
part, that ". . . the employer shall be liable to provide and pay
compensation under the provisions of this chapter and shall . ..be
released from all other liability." (Emphasis added). 1
The trial court entered summary judgment denying plaintiff's
claim on the theory that Jackson, as the employer of Norris, was
insulated against the claim by reason of the above quoted exclusiveremedy provision of the Workmen's Compensation Act. On appeal
no proof was heard. Held: Reversed. The so-called exclusive-remedy
provision of the Workmen's Compensation Act does not insulate the
employer from tort liability asserted against him by way of indemnity
in the circumstances of the instant case. Kentucky Utilities Company
v. Jackson County Rural Electric Cooperative Corporation,438 S.W.2d
788 (Ky. 1968).
1Ky.REv.

STAT.

[hereinafter cited as KRS] § 342.015(1) (1956).
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The effect of the Jackson decision is to again raise what has been
called "perhaps the most evenly-balanced controversy in all of compensation law."2 As one writer pointed out, "In answering this
question the courts have not been consistent, for there are objections
to both solutions [indemnity or contribution]."3 The question for
consideration here is, how far did the framers of the Workmen's
Compensation Act intend to extend the immunity of the exclusiveremedy clause? In upholding the constitutionality of an early workmen's compensation act, the U.S. Supreme Court indicated that the
declared policy of the law was to strictly limit the employer's liability
4
in exchange for his liability without fault.
Before proceeding further, an important distinction should be
made between indemnity and contribution. In 1965, the Kentucky
Court of Appeals, noting this distinction, explained it as follows:
The theory of contribution is that a party required to pay more
than his pro rata share of a common liability to an injured party
has a right of recovery for one-half the amount paid against a joint
tortfeasor in par delicto, that is, one equally at fault from the
standpoint of concurrent negligence of substantially the same
character . . . on the other hand, a right to total indemnity may
exist if the joint tortfeasors are not in par delicto and the party
secondarily negligent asserts a claim against the one primarily
negligent. 5

2 See 2 LARSON, WoaxI
's COMPENSAION LAW [hereinafter cited as
LAnsON] § 76.10 (1965).
3 See Note, Contribution and Indemnity: The Effects of Workmen's Compensation Acts, 42 VA. L. REv. 959 (1956). There the writer points out:
If contribution or indemnity is allowed, an objective of the workmen's
compensation acts, limiting the employer's liability, is defeated. An
action by an employee against the third party, who is then allowed
contribution or indemnity against the employer, is, in effect, an action
against the employer directly, although the money passes through the
hands of a third party. But if contribution or indemnity is not allowed,
the third party, who has received no benefits from the workmens compensation act, is forced to pay all of the damages when normally he
would only be liable for part (with contribution) or none at all (with
indemnity). Id. at 959.
4 New York Cent. R.R. Co. v. White, 243 U.S. 188 (1916). Therein, the
Court asserted:
The statute under consideration sets aside one body of rules only to
establish another system in its place. If the employee is no longer able
to recover as much as before in case of being injured through the employer's negligence, he is entitled to moderate compenqation in all cases
of iniury, and has a certain and speedy remedy without the difficultv and
expense of establishing negligence or proving the amount of the damages.
Instead of assuming the entire consequences of all ordinary risks of the
occupation, he assumes the consecuences, in excess of the scheduled
comppn'ation, of riqks ordinary and extraordinary. On the other hand,
if the employer is left without defense respecting the question of fault;
he at the same time is assured that the recovery is limited, and that it
goes directly to the relief of the designated beneficiary. Id. at 201.
5 Lexington Country Club v. Stevenson, 390 S.W.2d 137, 143 (Ky. 1965).
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From the foregoing statement, it is obvious that indemnity, alone,
would be KU's remedy in the Jackson case. Bearing in mind the
distinction between contribution and indemnity, the rule seems to
be, "The third party may recover over against the employer whenever it can be said that the employer breached an independent duty
towards the third party and thus acquired an obligation to indemnify
the third party."6 The question thus becomes, under what circumstances does the "independent duty" arise between the employer
and third party?
Professor Larson points out that there are four acts that create
the independent obligation to indemnify: (1) express contract of
indemnity, (2) separate duty based on relationship, (3) separate
implied obligation to use care, and (4) duty of primary to secondary
wrongdoer.7 Another writer has said, "The courts are unanimous in
holding that the workmen's compensation acts do not bar a claim
for indemnity by the third party from the employer when that claim
is based on an express contract of indemnity."" The same writer
goes on to state, "Absent such an express contract, there has been
conflict on whether the right to indemnity has survived the exclusive
liability clause of the workmen's compensation acts."9
The general consensus is that the leading case permitting the
indemnity from the employer is Westchester Lighting Company v.
0 Since the
Westchester County Small Estates Corporation.'
Court
in Jackson specifically adopted the rationale expounded in Westchester, it seems appropriate to examine and compare the facts in the
Westchester case. There, the New York Court of Appeals recited
the following facts:
...

[E]mployees of the defendant negligently broke a gas pipe

maintained by the plaintiff in the public highway and negligently
inclosed the point of fracture within a tile drain laid by them; that
as a result gas escaped into a nearby house and there asphyxiated
John Haviland, an employee of the defendant, who was in the
course of his employment at the time; that the only wrong of the
plaintiff which contributed to this casualty was a failure to make
timely discovery that gas was escaping from its pipe; that
Haviland's administratrix had judgment against the plaintiff in
an action brought to recover the damages caused by her decedents
death; and that the plaintiff paid that judgment and also the cost
of the defense of that action."
6 2 LAsoN § 76.30.
7Id. at § 76.40.
8 42 VA. L. REv., supra note 3, at 969.
9 Id. at 970.

10278 N.Y. 175, 15 N.E.2d 567 (1938).
11 Id.
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In both Jackson and Westchester the employers were alleged to
have been primarily or actively negligent, while the third parties
were alleged to have been secondarily or passively negligent in their
failure to discover the hazard. In Westchester, the court fully recognized that "an employer is made liable indirectly in an amount which
could not be recovered directly;" 12 nevertheless, it granted indemnity
by holding, "An independent duty or obligation owed by the employer
to the third party is a sufficient basis for the action." 18 The nature of
that "independent duty or obligation" was not made clear. As a
result, the Westchester case has been a source of continuous controversy. "It has been cited in nearly every other decision permitting
indemnity over objections based on the workmen's compensation
acts, and many cases denying indemnity have been compelled to
distinguish this case."1 4 Chief Judge Crane, vigorously dissenting in
Westchester, interpreted the majority opinion's finding of an "independent duty" as being based on the "primary negligence" of
the employer. 15
The Kentucky Court of Appeals has undoubtedly accepted this
theory of the "independent duty" concept as being based on the
primary-secondary negligence distinction. In Jackson, the court cited
Brown Hotel Company v. PittsburghFuel Company'6 as primary case

authority for the proposition that,
:.

.

the common-law right of indemnity exists in Kentucky ...

in favor of the passively or secondarily negligent against the
actively or primarily negligent party where one of two parties

does an act or creates a hazard by which the other party, though
not concurrently
joining in the act, is thereby exposed to a third
7
party.'

Admitting that the decisions of other state and federal jurisdictions were not "in harmony as to the question before us," the Court
in Jackson explained, "We consider that certain aspects of Kentucky
law make inapplicable many of the decisions from other jurisdictions
where similar laws are not in force. 8 It is to these "certain aspects
of Kentucky law" that our attention is next turned.
The Court considered Jackson's defense, based on the exclusiveremedy clause, 19 in light of section 54 of the Kentucky Constitution
12 Id.at 568.
13 Id. at 569.

14 42 VA. L. REv., supra note 3, at 970.
'5278 N.Y. at 185, 15 N.E.2d at 571 (1938).
16 311 Ky. 3962 224 S.W.2d 165 (1949).
17 438 S.W.2d 788, 790 (Ky. 1968).
181 d.
29 KRS § 342.015(1) (1956).
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which provides: "The General Assembly shall have no power to limit
the amount to be recovered for injuries resulting in death, or for
injuries to person or property." Citing Kentucky State Journal Company v. Workmen's Compensation Board0 as case authority, the
Court in Jackson pointed out, "It was the mandate of that constitutional provision which invalidated the first Workmen's Compensation Act in Kentucky."2' (The first Kentucky Workmen's Compensation Act provided for a compulsory system in contrast to the existing
system which is elective.) Using Happy v. Erwin22 and Ludwig v.
Johnson23 as precedent, the Court reasoned:
that jural rights which had become well established before the
adoption of the Constitution are preserved by the Constitution.
It seems clear that the common-law right of indemnity is a jural
right which existed prior to the adoption of our Constitution and
may not be abolished by the General Assembly .... 24
...

The court failed, however, to consider section 233 of the Kentucky
Constitution which provides that the common law shall be enforced
within the Commonwealth until it is altered or repealed by the
General Assembly. 25 In construing that particular constitutional provision, the Court had previously stated in City of Louisville v.
Chapman:
But the common law is not now, nor was it ever, a static body of
law. It (the common law) may be likened to a mighty rising river.
It may and it must spill over into new fields and new territory in
order to make its way to the sea....
...

We do not think the framers of our Constitution intended

to shackle the bands of the judicial branch of government in its

interpretation, modification, or abolition of the great body of
of changing times.
mutable common law
26 to meet the demands
(Emphasis added.)
Although in Chapman the court dealt with the problem of governmental immunity (a product of the common law), it is evident from
20161 Ky. 562, 170 S.W. 1166 (1915).
21438 S.W.2d at 790.

330 S.W.2d 412 (Ky. 1959).
243 Ky. 534, 49 S.W.2d 347 (1932).
438 S.W.2d at 790.
25
Ky. Co NsT. § 233 fully states:
All laws which, on the first day of June, one thousand seven hundred and
ninety-two, were in force in the State of Virginia, and which are of a
general nature and not local to that state, and not repugnant to this
Constitution, nor to the laws which have been enacted by the General
Assembly of this Commonwealth, shall be in force within this state until
they shall be altered or repealed by the General Assembly.
20413 S.W.2d 74, 77 (Ky. 1967).
22
23
24
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the above that the Court therein acknowledged the time-honored,
judicial prerogative of interpreting, modifying or abolishing the
common law in order to stay abreast of change. The Court in
Chapman allowed a modification of the common law to the extent
of sanctioning an action for personal injuries against a municipal
corporation. Concededly, the factual situation in Chapman is not in
point; nevertheless, the judicial prerogative exercised in the former
case is pertinent to our continued discussion of Jackson. The Court in
Jackson did not effectuate any change in the common-law right of
indemnity and its application to the field of workmen's compensation
law. The question remains, should it have?
Judge Learned Hand noted in one of his judicial opinions that:
So far as we can see, therefore, there is no body of sure authorityfor
saying that differences in degrees of fault between two tortfeasors
will without more strip one of them, if he is an employer, of
27 the
protection of the compensation act.... (Emphasis added.)
Another writer summed up Judge Hand's opinion by saying that
. before there can be common law indemnity or contribution
between two tortfeasors, there must be two tortfeasors. When the
Workmen's Compensation Act is applicable there are not two tortfeasors."28 Looking behind the mere legal fictions, however, one
should examine the policy arguments supporting the conflicting viewpoints. The argument most frequently heard against recovery-over
is that "the allowance of such recovery-over accomplishes indirectly
what cannot be done directly, and therefore, evades the spirit of
the legislation."29 Professor Larson tries to counter this argument by
stating:
[Tihe injured employee got quid pro quo, in receiving assured
compensation payments as a substitute for tort recoveries, while
the third party has received nothing, and hence should not be
impliedly held to have given up rights which he had before. It
is unfair to pull the third party within the principle of mutual
sacrifice when his part is to be all sacrifice and no corresponding
gain.s0
27

Slattery v. Marra Bros., Inc., 186 F.2d 134, 139 (2d Cir. 1951).
28 See Forney, Employer's Liability for Contribution or Indemnity?, 34
CouNsEL J. 362, 366 (1967). There the writer also explained:
Since common-law indemnity requires common liability, in theory it
should not be available to a defendant against the plaintiff's employer,
since there is no common liability by virtue of the workmens compensation act. The employer owes no duty to the plaintiff employee, the
breach of which would constitute "actionable" negligence. Id. at 365.
292 L.,soN § 76.52.
so Id,
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What is proposed is legislative cognizance of the existing controversy and proper action thereon. Again Larson has stated rather
succinctly,
It is rather inconsiderate to force courts to speculate about legislative intention on the strength of statutory language in framing
which the draftsmen had not the remotest trace of the present
question in their minds.3 1
Another writer is even more critical in explaining:
The legislatures, in expressing their intentions, probably did not
consider the possibility that the third party might sue the negligent
employer for contribution or indemnity. However, many of the
courts, after balancing the equities involved, have permitted such
actions for contribution or indemnity even though this has required
82
a patent circumvention of the legislatures' expressed intent
The crux of the problem is really one of "loss distribution." It
should be settled legislatively by an amendment to the present Workmen's Compensation Act in Kentucky. If the legislature is apathetic,
the Court should not shirk its ever-present duty to keep constantly
abreast of changing needs. As previously observed, 33 the Court has
proven that it can and will meet the challenge head-on. When
necessary, the Court should and must modify, alter or abolish the
common law where its application would disrupt or defeat the spirit
and purpose of a valid, legislative plan, i.e., the Workmen's Compensation Act.
Since our workmen's compensation plan is elective, a proper
solution would be an adoption of an amendment similar to the
provision in the "... . Illinois-type act, in which no person under the act
can ever become liable at common law to an injured employee, or
34
to a subrogated employee for more than his compensation out-lay."
As Larson explains, "This at least narrows the range of possible injustice by excluding third parties who are also within the compensation system." 35 The question would remain, would a third party, not
within the compensation system, who is liable to the employee for
damages, be able to receive indemnity against the employer who is
within the system?
The best and most direct way to obviate the problem of indemnity
within the workmen's compensation context would be to make all
31 Id.at § 76.53.
32 42 VA. L.R v. supra note 2, at 963.
33
City of Louisvile v. Chapman, 413 S.W.2d 74 (Ky. 1967).
34 2 LABsoN § 76.53.
35 Id.
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who are within the compensation system immune from any suits
for injuries or death, with, of course, the exception of a deliberate
act on the part of the employer or willful misconduct on the part
of the employee. 36 Where the third party tortfeasor is not within
the compensation system, common law indemnity should be modified to the extent that recovery-over against a negligent employer
would be restricted to that amount for which the employer would
be liable under the compensation act. A legislative amendment or
judicial declaration carrying forth these views would not result in
compulsory compensation coverage. While the system would remain
elective, there would be an added incentive for all employers to
come under the coverage of the act. At the same time, it would put
new vitality into an act which must be adaptable to the changing
times of our society.
At present, three states have adopted a boundary line of compensation system immunity around the entire membership of the
state's compensation family.37 It remains to be seen whether Kentucky
will join the progressive minority and adopt what appears to be the
better view.
Donald K. James

STATEMENTS-COURT BEVERsES LONG
LINE OF DEcisIoNs.-Tex Jett was charged with detaining his sisterin-law with intent to have carnal knowledge of her.' On the night in
question, Jett, his wife and his sister-in-law were together at the Jett
home. At trial Mrs. Jett testified that she called the police and summoned them to her home because Mr. Jett was drunk and out of
control. The commonwealth's attorney was permitted to call as a
witness the police officer who received Mrs. Jett's phone call. He
testified that Mrs. Jett said her husband was drunk and molesting
her sister. Mr. Jett appealed, objecting to this latter testimony on
the ground that it was hearsay. 2 Held: Reversed. When both the
EVIDENCE-PmOR INCONSISTENT

3
36
7 See

KRS § 342.015(2) & (3).
Alabama Workmen's Compensation Act, Tit. 26, § 312 (formerly § 7587)
(1947); ILL. ANNO. ST., Ch. 48, §§ 139, 166 (Smith-Hurd 1935); REV. CODE OF
WA H. § 7675 (1951); See also 2 LAEsoN § 72.40 for further comment on the effect
of these statutes.
IKentucky's statute defining the crime of having carnal knowledge of a
female is found in Ky. BEv. STAT. [hereinafter cited as KRS] § 435.110 (1942).
2 The trial judge had instructed the jury to use the out-of-court statement
by Mrs. Jett only as affecting the witness' credibility, not substantively for the

truthfulness of its content.

